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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NUCOR CORPORATION, NUCOR STEEL - UTAH DIVISION 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL DECISION 
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The brief of the Utah State Tax Commission is a remarkable 
document. Except for asserting ex cathedra that a 
straightforward reading of the statute is "simplistic" and 
"flawed," the brief never once addresses the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28). Brief of Respondent/Appellee 
at 10 (hereafter cited as "Resp. Br."). Instead, the brief 
struggles mightily to impose a "primary purpose" test of one 
ilk or the other upon an otherwise clear legislative 
pronouncement. The Court should reject the Commission's 
attempts at legislative revision. The tax exemption at issue 
here does not turn upon whether ingredients or component parts 
of manufactured items are "consumed" (Resp. Br. 16-19), put to 
some specified "use" (Resp. Br. 19-22) or purchased 
1 
"primarily" for one purpose rather than another (Resp. Br. 23-
27). Instead, tax exemption hinges upon whether property is 
purchased "in the regular course of business" with the intent 
that it will be offered "for resale" as "an ingredient or 
component part of a manufactured or compounded product." Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28). So construed, the statute is 
straightforward, easy to apply and does not (the Commission's 
ominous intonations to the contrary) result in taxpayer abuse. 
Before addressing the legal flaws in the Commissions 
submission, however, it is necessary to correct a serious 
factual error repeated throughout the Commission's brief. 
Beginning with its version of the "Issue Presented For 
Review," and continuing throughout the brief as the factual 
predicate for its various "primary purpose" arguments, the 
Commission asserts that the lances and mills rolls at issue 
here were "purchased as equipment to be used in the 
manufacturing process." Resp. Br. 2. See also id. at 5, 7, 
9, 10, 12, 19, 21, 23, 26, 29 (referring to the disputed 
property as "equipment" or "machinery"). The Commission's 
bald recharacterization of the disputed property as 
"equipment" and/or "machinery" is erroneous. 
Prior to the hearing below, the Commission's Auditing 
Division stipulated that all of the property at issue — the 
lance pipes, stirring lances and mill rolls — were purchased 
with the specific intent that they would be used "as an iron 
- 2 -
source for [Nucor's] products." App. B to P e t i t i o n e r ' s Brief 
(hereafter "Pet. Br.") at 2, 3. Iron, of course, i s an 
"essent ia l ingredient[ ] of . . . s t e e l " (Id. at 4 -5 ) , and 100% 
of the lances and mi l l r o l l s are incorporated into Nucor's 
various f ina l products. Id. at 6, 8, 10-11; Tr. 46-47, 121. l 
This incorporation, moreover, occurs at the very moment the 
lances and mi l l r o l l s are pressed into use . Id. As a r e s u l t , 
these items have an exceedingly short l i f e span.2 
Consistent with t h e i r short l i f e span, Nucor has always 
accounted for lances and mi l l r o l l s as raw ingredients rather 
than as "equipment" or "machinery." In common accounting and 
income tax parlance, "equipment" and "machinery" are 
considered depreciable cap i ta l a s s e t s rather than ordinary 
operating expenses. This i s so because of t h e i r extended 
useful l i f e . See, e . g . , Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (Unabridged) 332 (1981)(defining "capital a s se t s" 
as "long-term a s s e t s e i ther tangible or in tang ib le") . In 
The Commission's assert ion that only "[p]ortions of these items" enter 
into Nucor's products i s erroneous. Resp. Br. 14. The record here is 
unmistakable: 100% of the lances and mill r o l l s are incorporated into 
Nucor's final products (including finished s t ee l , scale, and s lag) . 
App. B to Pet. Br. a t 6, 8, 10-11. 
The lances, for example, become 100% incorporated into Nucor's products 
simultaneously with thei r use. App. B to Pet. Br. at 8, 9. The mill 
r o l l s are similarly rapidly incorporated into Nucor's f inal products. 
Approximately 12% of the ro l l s is d i rec t ly transferred to finished 
s tee l or the co-product scale during the ro l l ing process. Id. at 10. 
The remaining 88% of the ro l l s thereafter quickly becomes an iron 
source for Nucor's f inal products because mill r o l l s are "shortl ived." 
Tr. 51-52. 
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accordance with this common understanding and because of their 
short useful life, lances and mill rolls are not carried on 
Nucor's books as capital expenditures. Tr. 96-97. Instead, 
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, 
the lances and mill rolls are "expensed" as raw material 
costs. Id. That is, the cost of the lances and mill rolls — 
like the cost of the scrap iron and other materials used to 
make Nucor's final products — are "allocated . . . to 
[Nucor's] finished steel product[s]." Id. at 97. Nucor's 
sales revenues, moreover, have "consistently exceeded" the 
costs of all raw materials (including the lances and mill 
rolls) allocated to its finished steel products. Id. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission's appellate 
characterization of the lances and mill rolls as "equipment" 
or "machinery" is pure ipse dixit. The parties have 
stipulated that, beyond whatever utility they have in the 
manufacturing process, the lances and mill rolls also have an 
intended use as a necessary raw ingredient in Nucor's 
products. Nucor's accounting practices, furthermore, 
establish that lances and mill rolls are indistinguishable 
from other raw materials used to make Nucor's products. These 
facts, as shown in the opening brief and below, dictate the 
outcome in this case. The Commission should not be permitted 
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to evade that outcome by the simple expedient of recasting the 
record to fit its legal theory.3 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 59 -12 -104(28) CONFIRMS 
NUCOR'S ENTITLEMENT TO A SALES AND USE TAX EXEMPTION 
At t h e o u t s e t of i t s l e g a l argument, t h e Commission 
c a n d i d l y concedes t h a t the property a t i s s u e here f a l l s w i t h i n 
t h e p l a i n language of Utah Code Ann. § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 4 ( 2 8 ) . The 
Commission n o t e s t h a t t h e l a n c e s and m i l l r o l l s "are property 
purchased ' i n t h e r e g u l a r course of b u s i n e s s ' wi th the i n t e n t 
t h a t they w i l l be o f f e r e d ' f o r r e s a l e ' as 'an i n g r e d i e n t or 
component par t of a manufactured or compounded p r o d u c t . ' " 
Resp. Br. 9 (quot ing § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 4 ( 2 8 ) ) . The Commission then 
spends t h e r e s t of i t s b r i e f v a l i a n t l y a t t empt ing t o evade the 
import of t h i s c o n c e s s i o n by w r i t i n g a "primary purpose" t e s t 
i n t o t h e s t a t u t e . The e f f o r t i s u n a v a i l i n g . 
The Commission has c i t e d no a u t h o r i t y t o counter t h e w e l l -
e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e , documented i n Nucor's opening b r i e f (a t 15-
16, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 8 - 3 2 ) ( c i t i n g numerous c a s e s ) , t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l 
g u i d e p o s t f o r s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h e p l a i n meaning of 
l e g i s l a t i v e language . Nucor's purchases , as even t h e 
One other factual matter warrants clarif ication. This case, in i t s 
present posture, does not involve a $1.1 million threat to the public 
f i sc , as implied in the Commission's brief. Resp. Br. 6. Because the 
Commission concluded that Nucor's electrode purchases were exempt from 
sales tax, nearly $1 million of the original tax assessment has already 
been resolved in favor of Nucor. App. B to Pet. Br. 12. 
- 5 -
Commission concedes, fall within the plain language of § 59-
12-104(28). Moreover, cursory examination of the tax 
exemption scheme established by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 
demonstrates that, when the Legislature intends to make tax 
exemption hinge upon a "primary purpose" test, it knows how to 
do so. Pet. Br. 29-30 (noting that subsections (5), (17) and 
(22) of § 59-12-104 — but not subsection (28) — expressly 
incorporate a "primary purpose" test).4 The "best evidence of 
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature" is the "plain 
language of the Act." Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). The plain language of 
§ 59-12-104(28) is dispositive here. 
To avoid the obvious force of the foregoing, the 
Commission urges this Court to defer to its "expertise" and 
"practical, firsthand experience." Resp. Br. 4. No such 
deference is due. Questions "of statutory construction are 
matters of law for the courts, and we rely on a 'correction of 
error' standard of review, according no deference to an 
administrative agency's interpretation." Chris & Dick's 
Lumber v. Tax r^ppjggirm,. 791 P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1990). 
Accord, Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 
That the Legislature is well aware of the "primary purpose" test and how 
to impose it is established beyond dispute by the last legislative 
session. The Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(5) during 
the 1991 General Session to delete the adjective "primarily" that it 
had added to the code in 1984. H.B. 43, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1991 
Utah Lavs. 
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549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1976)(Commission actions "which [are] 
not commensurate with, or [are] contrary to the express 
provisions" of a taxing statute are a nullity); Robert H. 
Hinckley. Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 404 P.2d 662, 668 
(Utah 1965)(same)• Indeed, if an agency "has 'misconstrued or 
misapplied' [a] statute 'it is the duty of the court to 
correct the same.'" Boyd v. Department of Employment 
Security. 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah App. 1989)(quoting McPhie v. 
Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977)). This 
case presents a simple question of statutory construction. 
And, as shown in Nucor's opening brief and Section II of this 
reply, the Commission's disregard of the plain language of the 
statute is erroneous. This Court, therefore, has a "'duty . . 
. to correct the same.'" Id. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S ATTEMPTS TO ENGRAFT A "PRIMARY 
PURPOSE" TEST ONTO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
§ 59-12-104(28) ARE SERIOUSLY FLAWED 
The Commission's entire submission is that, rather than 
applying the plain language of § 59-12-104(28), the Court 
should read a "primary purpose" test into the statute. To 
that end, the Commission offers three variations on a theme. 
First, the Commission argues that Nucor should be denied an 
exemption for its lances and mill rolls because "it consumes 
these items in the manufacturing process." Resp. Br. 16. 
Second, it claims that Nucor is not entitled to an exemption 
because "the use of the [disputed] items is principally as 
- 7 
machinery ." I d . a t 19. F i n a l l y , t h e Commission e s s e n t i a l l y 
r e p e a t s t h e f i r s t two a s s e r t i o n s and argues t h a t t h e l a n c e s 
and m i l l r o l l s * f a i l [ ] t h e primary purpose t e s t . " I d . a t 2 3 . 5 
According t o t h e Commission, t h e "consumption" and "use" 
t e s t s are d e r i v e d from t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Union Port land 
Cement Co. v . S t a t e Tax Commission. 170 P.2d 164 (Utah 1 9 4 6 ) . 
Resp. Br. 15 . The Commission's e x p l i c i t "primary purpose" 
t e s t , not e x p r e s s l y adopted in Union P o r t l a n d , i s s a i d t o be 
" e v i d e n t from t h e language of t h a t c a s e . " I d . a t 2 3 . As 
noted i n Nucor ' s opening b r i e f ( a t 2 4 - 2 7 ) , however, t h e 
Commission's h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l read ing of Union Port land i s o f f 
t h e mark. 
To b e g i n w i t h , t h e Commission i s q u i t e r i g h t i n conceding 
t h a t Union Por t land does not e x p r e s s l y adopt a "primary 
purpose" t e s t . Resp. Br. 2 3 . I t does n o t . The c a s e ' s 
"consumption" and "use" c o n s t r u c t s , furthermore , a l s o f a i l t o 
support a "primary purpose" a n a l y s i s . As noted i n Nucor ' s 
opening b r i e f ( a t 2 5 - 2 6 ) , Union Port land d i d not invoke 
The Commission's "consumption," "use" and "primary purpose" tests --
while separately briefed both here and in the Commission's submission 
-- are essential ly three ways of playing the same tune: a l l three tests 
purport to show that the lances and mill rol ls serve functions other 
than as raw ingredients, and that those functions are somehow more 
"important" than any raw ingredient status. The interrelated nature of 
these purportedly separate "tests" i s demonstrated by the Commission's 
own decision, which used the essential elements of a l l three "tests" 
concurrently. E.g.. App. i to Docketing Statement at 8 (noting that, 
while Nucor's processes involved an "unavoidable consumption of the 
pipes," the "use of the pipes and lances" did not show that their 
"primary purpose . . . was as a source of iron"). 
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"consumption" and "use" as independent t e s t s of t a x a b i l i t y vel 
non. Rather, those concepts were used s o l e l y to determine 
whether the taxpayer intended to use disputed items as 
"ingredients" of a manufactured product.6 If disputed items 
are intended to be used as ingredients and actua l ly become 
part of a f inished product, Union Portland supports rather 
than denies tax exemption. That t h i s i s the correct reading 
of Union Portland i s confirmed by an annotation, written 
short ly a f ter the Union Portland dec i s ion , which c i t e s the 
case for the proposit ion that an ingredient or component i s 
e n t i t l e d to tax exemption "if i t ac tua l ly was intended to and 
did function as an ingredient ." Annotation, "Items or 
materials exempt from use tax as used in manufacturing, 
processing, or the l i k e , " 30 A.L.R.2d 1439, 1441 n. 10, 1456-
1457 (1953). The disputed items here, of course, meet that 
t e s t . 7 
See 170 P.2d at 170 (Court notes , in the course of discussing 
"consumption," that the "purpose of the iron b a l l s i s to serve as a 
grinding agent rather than to provide iron for the cement," and that 
the "coal i s used to produce heat and not to add ash to the cement"); 
id . at 172 (Court notes , in the course of discussing "use," that the 
fact materials "incidental ly enter into the products manufactured does 
not exempt the manufacturer from . . . sa les or use tax"). 
Contrary to the Commission's characterizat ion, Nucor does not read Union 
Portland as turning upon whether given items are "essent ia l or 
incidental ingredients to the f inished product." Resp. Br. 21 
(emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) . See a lso Resp. Br. 18 (assert ing that Nucor 
reads Union Portland as es tabl i sh ing a "necessary and important 
ingredient" a n a l y s i s ) . While the iron supplied by the lances and mil l 
r o l l s is , an e s s e n t i a l component of Nucor's products (App. B to Pet. Br. 
at 4 ) , that fact i s not alone dec i s ive under Union Portland. Rather, 
Union Portland exempts intended ingredients from taxation. Nucor's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The misconstruction of Union Portland is not the only 
error underlying the Commission's submission, however. The 
Commission's "consumption,* "use," and "primary purpose" tests 
are seriously flawed on their own terms. The logic underlying 
the Commission's "consumption" test is not applicable to this 
case. Moreover, if the "consumption" test were applied as 
suggested in the Commission's brief, it would render the 
statutory tax exemption for ingredients or component parts 
essentially nugatory because virtually all ingredients or 
components of manufactured products are "consumed" (i.e., 
transformed) during the manufacturing process. The "use" 
test, in turn, improperly denies a tax exemption for property 
having a dual use and is factually and legally unsupported. 
The Commission's explicit "primary purpose" arguments, 
finally, are not necessary to prevent taxpayer abuse and are 
merely a thinly-disguised plea for judicial legislation — a 
plea that numerous state Supreme Courts have declined. Each 
of these points will be discussed in turn. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
lances and mill rolls are purchased with the specific intent that they 
will be incorporated into the company's final products. App. B to Pet. 
Br. at 2-3. They are, therefore, entitled to exemption under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(28). 
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A. The Commission's "Consumption" Test Is 
Illogical And Renders The Statutory Exemption 
For "Ingredients" A Dead Letter 
Reasoning that "while the sales and use tax should not be 
exacted more than once, it should be paid at least once," the 
Commission submits that items "consumed" by a manufacturer 
should be subject to taxation "because such articles are not 
passed on to other users and therefore are not taxable to 
anyone else down the line." Resp. Br. 16. The Commission's 
formal reasoning proceeds as follows (id.): 
Major Premise: Sales and use taxes should be 
collected once, but not more than once. 
Minor Premise: Items that are "consumed" in the 
manufacturing process are not passed on to later 
purchasers and are therefore not subject to 
subsequent sales tax. 
Conclusion: Items "consumed" in the manufacturing 
process should be subject to a sales tax imposed on 
the manufacturer. 
Nucor, of course, concurs in the Commission's major premise. 
The record, however, reveals at least two serious flaws in the 
Commission's construction of the minor premise which render 
the logic of its syllogism inapplicable to this case. Indeed, 
as applied by the Commission, "consumption" analysis would 
render § 59-12-104(28) essentially nugatory. 
As an initial matter, the record makes it quite clear that 
Nucor does not "consume" the lances and mill rolls. "Consume" 
is defined by the Commission as "'to use up, expend, waste, 
devour.'" Id^ . at 17 (quoting Union Portland, 170 P.2d at 
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171). This definition simply does not apply to Nucor's use of 
the lances and mill rolls. When the lances and mill rolls are 
used in the manufacturing process, they simply change form. 
Tr. 123. This change of form, however, does not "use up, 
expend, waste or devour" the lances and mill rolls. It is 
undisputed — and the Auditing Division of the Commission 
stipulated — that the lances and mill rolls have two uses: to 
aid in the manufacturing process and to become an essential 
ingredient of Nucor's final products. App. B to Pet. Br. at 
2-3. As a result, when the manufacturing process is completed 
the lances and mill rolls are not used up, expended, wasted or 
devoured: the property still has demonstrable utility as an 
intended, essential ingredient of Nucor's products.8 
The second flaw in the Commissions minor premise flows 
from the preceding discussion: contrary to the Commission's 
assumption, the lances and mill rolls are passed on to 
subsequent consumers as essential ingredients of Nucor's 
products and are subject to sales tax. Indeed, even if one 
8 In this respect, the contrast with the factual record in Union Portland 
could not be clearer. In that case, the Court denied tax exemption 
because the property at issue (coal and grinding balls) was not 
intended as an ingredient. 170 P.2d at 170 (the "purpose of the iron 
balls is to serve as a grinding agent rather than to provide iron for 
the cement;'' the "coal is used to produce heat and not to add ash to 
the cement"). Therefore, in a real sense one could argue that the coal 
and grinding balls were "consumed:" at the conclusion of the 
manufacturing process, their only use had been "expended," "wasted," or 
"devoured." The same conclusion is simply impossible here, where the 
lances and mill rolls have a use that is not "expended," "wasted," or 
"devoured" at the conclusion of the manufacturing process. 
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were to conclude that the lances and mill rolls are somehow 
"consumed" because they are transformed in the manufacturing 
process, the economic value of the "consumed* for more 
accurately "transformed") items is still passed on and taxed 
to subsequent purchasers of Nucor's products, Nucor presented 
undisputed evidence that the cost of all lances and mill rolls 
used in the manufacturing process is allocated to its final 
products. Tr. 97. Moreover, "sales revenues . . . [have] 
consistently exceeded the cost" of all ingredients — 
including the lances and mill rolls — comprising Nucor's 
final products. Id. As a result, and contrary to the 
assumption underlying the Commission's minor premise, the full 
economic value of the lances and mill rolls is passed on to 
Nucor's customers in the cost of Nucor's final products. 
Because lances and mill rolls are intended ingredients of 
Nucor's products, Nucor's customers — upon purchase of its 
products — pay a sales tax on the full economic value of the 
lances and mill rolls. 
Application of the foregoing undisputed facts to the 
Commission's syllogism results in a conclusion directly 
contrary to the one the Commission espouses: 
Major premise: Sales and use taxes should be 
collected once, but not more than once. 
Minor premise: Lances and mill rolls, as intended 
ingredients of final products, are physically 
transferred to Nucor's customers who pay a sales tax 
on the total production cost (including the cost of 
the lances and mill rolls) of the final products. 
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Conclusion: Nucor's purchases of lances and mi l l 
r o l l s should not be subject to s a l e s tax; the "one 
time" tax i s imposed upon Nucor's customers at the 
time of s a l e . 
This reasoning (unlike the Commission's) i s not only sound as 
a matter of formal l o g i c , i t has a l so been invoked by several 
courts which have concluded that property transformed (or, 
more general ly , "consumed") in the manufacturing process i s 
exempt from s a l e s tax . 9 
Perhaps because i t recognizes the flaws in i t s formal 
reasoning, the Commission concludes i t s "consumption" ana lys i s 
with the straightforward — but s t a r t l i n g — asser t ion that 
Nucor's purchases of lances and mi l l r o l l s should be subject 
to tax "because such items are not passed on to other users as 
lance p ipes , s t i r r i n g lances , and mi l l r o l l s . " Resp. Br. 17. 
See a l s o id . at 19 (the lances and mi l l r o l l s should be 
9
 Davton Press. Inc. v. Lindlev. 489 N.E.2d 789, 791 (Ohio 1986)(tangible 
property "used or consumed during the preparation and production" of a 
f in ished product i s exempt from sa le s tax) ; Morton Buildings. Inc. v. 
Chu, 510 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)("raw materials [that] 
are wholly consumed'' during the manufacturing process are not subject 
to use tax because "[b]y i t s nature, manufacturing r e s u l t s in raw 
materials los ing the ir ident i ty ;" the tax must be imposed upon the 
f ina l product -- not upon the ingredients "consumed" in making i t ) ; 
R.L. Polk and Company v. Armold. 527 P.2d 973, 977-978 (Kan. 1974)(raw 
materials consumed in the manufacturing process are exempt from sa les 
and use t a x e s ) . Cf. Barrett Investment Company v. State Tax 
Commission. 387 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1964)(noting that the purpose of 
the predecessor to § 59-12-104(28) was to exempt "sales of tangible 
personal property in which the purpose of the consumer i s to 
incorporate by manufacturing, assembling, processing or ref ining the 
things transferred into tangible personal property for s a l e , or to use 
or consume the thing transferred d i r e c t l y in the production of tangible 
personal property for sale")(emphasis added)(quoting Bailv v. Tax 
Commissioner. 53 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio 1944)) . 
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subject to tax because they "are consumed until they no longer 
have any value whatsoever as lance pipes, stirring lances, and 
mill rolls"). The absurdity of this analysis is apparent. 
Nucor concedes that it does not pass lances and mill rolls 
on to its customers "as lances and mill rolls." But, Nucor 
does not pass scrap metal on to its customers "as scrap 
metal," either. Instead, Nucor transforms — or, to use the 
Commission's terminology, "consumes" — scrap metal until it 
"no longer has any value whatsoever as scrap metal." Cf. 
Resp. Br. 19. Does this "consumption" void Nucor's sales tax 
exemption for its purchases of scrap metal? Of course not. 
If it did, the tax exemption provided by § 59-12-104(28) would 
become a dead letter. Manufacturers never pass on ingredients 
or component parts of manufactured items "as ingredients" or 
"as components." Rather, ingredients and component parts are 
transformed or "consumed" in the manufacturing process and, as 
altered by the manufacturing process, are passed on and taxed 
to ultimate purchasers.10 Notwithstanding these alterations, 
however, the manufacturer is still entitled to a sales tax 
exemption for its ingredients and components. E.g., Nickerson 
Pump & Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission. 361 P.2d 520, 
68 Am. Jur. 2d, Sales and Use Taxes, § 112 at 160 ("consumption" is 
inevitable in the manufacturing process because the "terms 
'manufacturing' and 'processing' imply essentially a transformation or 
conversion of material or things into a different state or form from 
that in which they originally existed"). 
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521-522 (Utah 1961) (rejecting the Commission's argument that 
a manufacturer of water pumps was the "ultimate consumer" of 
— and therefore liable for sales tax upon — the various 
parts comprising a water pump). The Commission's contrary 
submission is simply unsupportable. 
B. A "Principal Use" Test Improperly Denies 
Tax Exemption To Dual-Use Property And 
Is Factually And Legally Unsupported 
The Commission next contends that, even if Nucor does not 
"consume" the lances and mill rolls, tax exemption is still 
inappropriate because these items are used "principally as 
machinery." Resp. Br. 19. This assertion is factually 
unsupported, improperly denies tax exempt status to dual-use 
property, and is in unavoidable (and legally untenable) 
tension with the Commission's own conclusion that Nucor's 
graphite electrode purchases are tax exempt. 
The Commission's assertion that the "principal use" of the 
lances and rolling mills is "as machinery" or "equipment" has 
already been refuted above. The record here is unmistakable: 
the lances and rolling mills have utility both in the 
manufacturing process and as raw materials. The record simply 
precludes any finding that lances and mill rolls have a 
"principal machinery" use as opposed to a "secondary raw 
ingredients" use: the Commission stipulated that the property 
has both uses and this case must be decided upon that ground. 
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Denying tax exempt status to dual-use property, 
furthermore, is unwarranted. The Commission's approach will 
require the agency — and this Court — to become embroiled in 
difficult (and often futile) searches for "the" principal use 
of property. See, e.g. Tr. 138-139 (expert testimony 
discussing the grave complexities of determining, from an 
economic standpoint, the principal use of items necessary to a 
manufacturing process). The complexity and unpredictability 
of the task is evidenced by this very case. Here, the 
Commission itself concluded that the graphite electrodes were 
tax exempt because, although they assisted in the steel 
refining process, they nevertheless provided a necessary 
ingredient (carbon) for Nucor's products. App. i to Docketing 
Statement at 6. Identical analysis, of course, also applies 
to the lances and stirring rods (which, in addition to 
assisting manufacture, add necessary ingredients to Nucor's 
products). As this case demonstrates, once this Court 
undertakes to separate "principal" from "secondary" uses, the 
legal lines will become increasingly complex and irrational. 
Contrary to the Commission's suggestion, moreover, the 
difficulty of separating "principal" from "secondary" uses is 
not ameliorated by looking at the respective costs of 
substitutes. See Resp. Br. 22 (suggesting that the principal 
use of lances and mill rolls is not as raw ingredients because 
other raw ingredients are available at lesser cost). Cost is 
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simply not an accurate indicator of "principal" uses and the 
Commission knows it. Indeed, the Commission's own regulations 
prohibit use of relative cost as a factor in determining which 
sales qualify for sales and use tax exemption. R865-19-29S 
(A)(1), (C) (1990) Utah Administrative Code ("All sales of 
tangible personal property or services which enter into and 
become an integral or component part of tangible personal 
property" are non-taxable "wholesale sales;" and "rtlhe price 
of tangible personal property or services sold or the quantity 
sold are not factors which determine whether or not the sale 
is a wholesale sale")(emphasis added). 
This Court has plainly demonstrated its unwillingness, 
absent legislative directive, to embark upon the treacherous 
task of separating "principal" from "secondary" uses. In Salt 
Lake County v. State Tax Commission. 779 P.2d 1131 (Utah 
1989), this Court rejected the argument that real property did 
not qualify for a preferential agricultural use exception 
because it was being used both for agricultural (grazing) and 
industrial (buffer zone) purposes. The Court refused to 
impose a "principal use" test upon the Farmland Assessment Act 
because the statute did not expressly require that land be 
"'primarily' devoted to an agricultural use" and "its plain 
meaning does not require such a construction." 779 P.2d at 
1J32. The same analysis — fatal to the Commission's 
"principal use" test — is applicable here. 
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C. Imposition Of A "Primary Purpose" Test 
Is Not Needed To Prevent Taxpayer Abuse 
And Should Be Left To The Legislature 
The Commission's final (and inconsistent) submissions are 
that this Court should "strictly construe" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(28) (Resp. Br, 27-29) and, in the course of that 
"strict" construction, read an explicit "primary purpose" test 
into the statute. Resp. Br. 23. To support this novel 
position, the Commission argues: that the test is necessary to 
prevent taxpayer abuse; that other states have adopted a 
"primary purpose" test; and that the test "allow[s] an 
exemption when one is due and den[ies] an exemption when one 
is not warranted." Id. at 23, 25, 26-27. These assertions do 
not support the Commission's reading of § 59-12-104(28). 
Nucor agrees that tax exemption statutes are to be 
strictly construed. But that principle simply does not aid 
the Commission because, as the very case it cites notes, in 
strictly construing a statute "there is also to be considered 
the over-arching principle, applicable to all statutes, that 
they should be construed and applied in accordance with the 
intent of the Legislature and the purpose sought to be 
accomplished." Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (1980). The legislative intent 
animating § 59-12-104(28) is clearly evidenced by the 
legislature's plain language. Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax 
Commission. 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990). The legislature 
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knows how to make tax exemption hinge upon a "primary purpose" 
a n a l y s i s , but i t has express ly refrained from adding the word 
"primarily" to § 59-12-104(28)• S t r i c t construct ion of the 
s t a t u t e , therefore , forbids j u d i c i a l in ser t ion of the 
a d j e c t i v e . Pet. Br. 2 8 - 3 0 . n 
A "primary purpose" t e s t , furthermore, i s not necessary to 
prevent taxpayer abuse. As noted in Nucor's opening br ie f (at 
32-33) , the p la in language of § 59-12-104(28) does not create 
a loophole through which Nucor can purchase " t r a c t o r / t r a i l e r s , 
f o r k l i f t s and typewriters" tax free . Resp. Br. 26.12 Nor i s 
the primary purpose t e s t needed to assure that the value of 
the lances and mi l l r o l l s does not "escape" taxat ion . The 
Commission argues that , because lances and mi l l pipes are more 
c o s t l y per pound than Nucor's other raw ingredients , unless 
Indeed, one of the " s t r i c t construction" cases c i t e d by the Commission 
(Resp. Br. 28 n.8) applied the principle to re jec t engrafting 
requirements upon the p la in language of a tax exemption s t a t u t e . In 
Board of County Commissioners v. St. Joseph Hospital of Kansas Citv. 
738 P.2d 454 (Kan. 1987), the t r i a l court had refused to grant a 
hosp i ta l a property tax exemption because the hosp i ta l was not 
operating in Kansas. The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the lower 
court ' s "in s tate" operation requirement because the hospi ta l met "the 
prec ise l i t e r a l requirements" of the tax exemption s ta tute and "the 
l e g i s l a t u r e could have e a s i l y l imited the exemption to hosp i ta l s 
operating in Kansas" but did not. 738 P.2d at 457, 458. "Giving the 
s ta tute s t r i c t construct ion," the Kansas Supreme Court applied the 
p la in language of the s ta tute to "conclude that there i s no requirement 
that the hospi ta l be operated in Kansas." Id. at 458. 
Unlike the lances and mi l l r o l l s at i s sue here, such items are long-
l i v e d cap i ta l a s s e t s . As such, t r a c t o r / t r a i l e r s , f o r k l i f t s and 
typewriters would be cap i ta l i z ed rather than expensed as materials and 
suppl ies . See pages 2-4, supra. 
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Nucor pays a s a l e s tax on these items "their economic u t i l i t y 
and use value would go untaxed." Resp. Br. 26. But, as noted 
above (at 12-13) , the f u l l economic value of the lances and 
mi l l r o l l s i s passed on to Nucor's f ina l customers, who pay a 
s a l e s tax on a purchase price that includes the t o t a l cost of 
a l l of Nucor's raw ingredients — including the lances and 
mil l r o l l s . Thus, there i s simply no r e a l i t y (economic or 
otherwise) to the Commission's assert ion that , without a 
"primary purpose" t e s t , economic values w i l l escape s a l e s and 
use taxat ion: Nucor's customers pay a s a l e s tax which covers 
the f u l l cos t of the lances and mi l l r o l l s . 
Not surpr is ing ly , most s t a t e supreme courts that have 
considered the i s sue have refused to inser t a "primary 
purpose" t e s t into tax exemption s t a t u t e s analogous to § 59-
12-104(28) . As the Commission notes , some s t a t e s have read a 
"primary purpose" t e s t into t h e i r tax exemption s ta tu te s . 1 3 
The Commission c i t e s cases from California, Ohio and Louisiana. [The 
c i t a t i o n given by the Commission for the Louisiana case i s erroneous; 
the case i s reported as Traigle v. PPG Industr ies . 332 So. 2d 777 (La. 
1976)] . In addition to these s t a t e s , see Hervev v. International Paper 
Co.. 483 S.W.2d 199 (Ark. 1972); Smith Oil & Refining Co. v. Dept. of 
Finance. 21 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1939). The persuasiveness of th i s 
authority, however, i s questionable. Ohio, for example, appears to be 
reconsidering appl icat ion of the "primary purpose" analysis to raw 
ingredients used in manufacturing. See Jeep Corp. v. Limbach. 547 
N.E.2d 975, 978-979 (Ohio 1989)(Ohio Supreme Court concludes that the 
"primary use" t e s t , adopted in ear l i e r cases , w i l l no longer apply to a 
sa les tax exemption for raw materials incorporated into a manufactured 
product; "As expressed in Just ice Paul Brown's d issent in United States 
Shoe Corp. v. Kosvdar. . . . the [primary purpose] t e s t was never meant 
for the incorporation exception and inaptly applies to i t " ) . 
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But many more s t a t e s have e i t h e r express ly re jec ted the 
Commission's "primary purpose" analysis 1 4 or have adopted an 
approach d i r e c t l y a n t i t h e t i c a l to a "primary purpose" t e s t by 
granting a s a l e s tax exemption to ingredients or components i f 
any portion of the ingredient or component becomes part of the 
f ina l product / 5 The weight of authority from other 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s , therefore , does not support the Commission. 
The reason why the weight of authority preponderates 
against the Commission i s c l ear : the Commission's "primary 
14
 North Star S t ee l v . Iowa Dept. of Revenue. 380 N.W.2d 677, 682, 683 
(Iowa 1986)("The department e r r ed in applying a primary use t e s t " 
because the t a x p a y e r ' s claimed exemption " t r acks the language of the 
s t a t e ' s manufactur ing-process exemption: the m a t e r i a l s a re ' t a n g i b l e 
pe rsona l p roper ty . . . which i t i s intended s h a l l , by means of . . . 
manufacturing . . . , become an i n t e g r a l p a r t of o ther t ang ib l e 
pe rsona l p roper ty intended to be so ld u l t i m a t e l y a t r e t a i l ' " ) ( q u o t i n g 
Iowa Code § 4 2 3 . 1 ( 1 ) ( a ) ) ; Lone S ta r I n d u s t r i e s v. S t a t e Department of 
Revenue. 647 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Wash. 1982)("The t r i a l cour t e r r ed in 
applying the 'pr imary purpose t e s t ' to i ng red i en t s or components. In 
doing so i t ignored the p l a i n language of" the s a l e s and use tax 
exemption); Nucor S tee l v . Herr ington. 322 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Neb. 
1982)("There i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for hold ing t h a t the purpose of us ing 
a substance which i s an e s s e n t i a l and c r i t i c a l i n g r e d i e n t of the 
f i n i shed product i s not a primary and important purpose simply because 
the re i s a l so another reason for us ing the substance which i s a l so 
impor t an t " ) ; S t a t e v . United S t a t e s S t ee l Corpora t ion . 206 So.2d 358, 
363 (Ala. 1968)( to apply the primary purpose t e s t "would be tantamount 
to w r i t i n g i n t o the s t a t u t e something the l e g i s l a t u r e d id n o t " ) ; 
Hercules Cont rac tors and Engineers . Inc . v . South Carol ina Tax 
Commission. 313 S.E.2d 300, 308 (S.C. App. 1984)(a s a l e s tax exemption 
does not "require t h a t the manufacturing use must be the primary u s e " ) . 
Under t h i s approach, the "primary purpose" for an i n g r e d i e n t or 
component i s i rre levant; i f anv p o r t i o n of the i n g r e d i e n t or component 
ends up in the f ina l p roduct , the purchase of the i n g r e d i e n t i s tax 
exempt. Al-Tom Investment . I nc . v . Di rec to r of Revenue. 774 S.W.2d 
131, 134-135 (Mo. 1989)(en banc) ; Finch. Pruvn & Co. . Inc . v . Tu l lv . 
419 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (N.Y.App.Div. 1979); Bullock v. Lone S ta r 
I n d u s t r i e s . I n c . . 584 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Hawes v. 
Custom Canners. I n c . . 173 S.E.2d 400, 402 (Ga. 1970). 
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purpose" test is a thinly-disguised plea for judicial 
legislation. The Legislature — not the Commission or this 
Court — performs the function of "allowing an exemption when 
one is due and denying an exemption when one is not 
warranted." Resp. Br. 25 and cases cited supra notes 14, 15. 
And, contrary to the Commission's position, the Legislature 
has concluded that a tax exemption "is due" (Resp. Br. 25) 
when property is purchased "in the regular course of business" 
with the intent that it will be offered "for resale" as "an 
ingredient or component part of a manufactured or compounded 
product." § 59-12-104(28). The Court should reject the 
Commission's invitation to embellish that unambiguous 
language.16 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision denying tax exempt status to 
Nucor's purchases should be reversed and Nucor's request for 
refund of taxes paid under protest should be granted. 
16 In its prayer for relief, the Commission cryptically suggests that the 
Court, at most, should "only allow an exemption to the extent of the 
scrap value of the equipment." Resp. Br. 30. This parting shot, not 
briefed or supported by citation to any authority, must be rejected. 
The plain language of § 59-12-104(28) does not authorize use of a "pro 
tanto" exemption analysis any more than a "primary purpose" analysis. 
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